Religion, The Constitution, and Modern Rivals: Our Founders and Theirs by Marty, William R.
Journal of Political Science 
Volume 16 Number 1 Article 10 
November 1988 
Religion, The Constitution, and Modern Rivals: Our Founders and 
Theirs 
William R. Marty 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Marty, William R. (1988) "Religion, The Constitution, and Modern Rivals: Our Founders and Theirs," Journal 
of Political Science: Vol. 16 : No. 1 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol16/iss1/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu. 
Religion, The Constitution, and Modern Rivals: 
Our Founders and Theirs 
WILLIAM R. MARTY 
Memphis State University 
The argument of this essay will be that our Constitution and 
politics are deeply informed by Christian understandings of the human 
condition, and that these understandings provided a deep sobriety in 
our politics sorely missed, often to catastrophic effect, by others: In-
deed, that much of modernity, from the French Revolution through the 
Fascist and Marxist revolutions, has been characterized by a wild in-
sobriety, producing terrible consequences, precisely because much of 
modernity has abandoned these understandings. Marx is the greatest 
modem founder after Rousseau. His understandings are found 
everywhere: in the churches, in the academy, in a myriad of regimes. 
He, and his revolutions, will provide the main contrast by which we 
may come to understand the depth of our debt to our founders. 
The American founding was marked by both confidence and cau-
tion: confidence that a free people has the right to rule itself, and the 
capability; caution in a most careful structuring of institutions to em-
power the people's government to act, but to do so in a way that pro-
vides careful guards and precautions against tyrannical abuse of 
power. This confidence and caution have a number of sources: classical 
republican theory, British parliamentary and legal traditions, 
Enlightenment faith in reason and progress, natural rights contract 
theory, and certain Christian understandings. The last were not least. 
They were of fundamental importance in establishing both the con-
fidence and the caution. 
Confidence in the right and ability of people to govern themselves 
arrived early on these shores. It came with Calvinist settlers who 
believed in congregational church government, with believers cove-
nanting with each other to form a congregation, calling or electing 
their own ministers and church officers, and retaining the power to 
remove those officers as well. And if covenants sufficed in the church, 
they sufficed as well in the state. Thus separatists, Calvinists who left 
the Anglican church to practice the true faith, first went to Holland, 
and then came here. We remember them as the Pilgrims who formed 
the Mayflower Compact, establishing by contract and consent in 1620 
the institutions that were to govern them. The Pilgrims were quickly 
followed by Puritans who, having stayed in the Anglican Church to 
reform from within, nevertheless resolved upon an "errand into the 
wilderness" to practice the purified faith. Receiving a charter from 
Charles I in 1629, they too relied upon compacts and covenants to form 
their church and governmental polities. 
The Calvinist emphasis upon covenants followed their understand-
ing of the faith. God had bound himself to Adam, Moses and Abraham 
in covenants, and He had established a new covenant, the covenant of 
grace, with mankind through the "second Adam," Jesus. And if "the 
omnipotent Ruler of the universe freely contracted to limit His rule by 
following rational procedures and laws, then surely it is incumbent 
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upon man to disallow absolute government over himself in both church 
and state. " 1 
How much is one to make of this religious emphasis upon covenant 
and compact, contracts and consent, elections in church and state? 
Some have made much of it. Very early, in 1603, James I of England, 
formerly James VI of Scotland, was confronted with a call for a 
General Assembly to reform the Anglican church by adopting the 
Presbyterian form of church polity. The call was for a reform 
abolishing church hierarchy and bishops, with elected ministers of 
equal rank (later appointed by synods but only upon approval by the 
congregation). James I responded that the Presbyterian form of ec-
clesiastical polity "as well agreeth with Monarchy, as God, and the 
Divell." And he told the Anglican bishops: "If once you were out, and 
they in place, I knowe what would become of my Supremacie. No 
Bishop, no King. "2 And in fact, when the Puritans gained control in the 
famous "Long Parliament," they ended by executing James' s suc-
cessor, Charles I. 
If James I and his son, Charles I, can be forgiven for thinking these 
Calvinist ideas important, others, their heads less immediately at 
stake, have felt able to ignore these ideas almost entirely. Some, when 
speaking of American revolutionary and constitutional theory, seem to 
think Hobbes invented contract theory, and Locke the clearly 
republican version thereof. To them, the American founding is the 
Lockian founding. 3 The difficulty with this is that Hobbes' Leviathan, 
published in 1651, and Locke's Two Treatises of Government, published 
in 1690, were long preceded by the Mayflower Compact, 1620, and the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony, with its charter, but also its internal 
covenants and contracts, in 1629. Americans were governing 
themselves by compact and consent, and doing it by God-given right as 
they understood it, long before either Hobbes or Locke wrote. It would 
perhaps be accurate to say that the Calvinists formed us to the usages 
and practices of self-government while Locke and Jefferson partly, but 
only partly, secularized the theory. 
The Calvinist emphasis upon covenants, upon the right to form the 
ecclesiastical polity by coming together and basing it upon sacred con-
tracts, and to form the civil polity in the same manner, to elect or ap-
prove ministers, to remove ministers and other church officers upon 
manifest unworthiness, to elect and remove civil magistrates as well, 
predated Hobbes and Locke, and helped to form the republican mind, 
as well as establishing republican practice. By the time of the revolu-
tion, and of the governmental arrangements which followed, 
Americans had confidence in the right and ability of the people to 
govern themselves. 
If there are, then, elements in Calvinism that produce confidence 
(Calvinists have been characterized as people "on their knees before 
God, on their feet before men"), there are others that produce great 
sobriety and caution. Calvinists were bound to be sober about men for 
they were orthodox Christians in believing that men were sinners. 
Understanding this, they understood, as did others, the need for strong 
government to compel men to behave. But Calvinists, more than 
others, drove the logic to its conclusion: if men are sinners, then no 
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one, neither rulers nor ruled, can be trusted with unrestrained power. 
John Cotton, for example, said it was necessary to limit the power 
given any man, in any office, secular or divine, whether of kings, 
princes, and magistrates, or officers of the church, or husband and wife 
or servant. "Let all the world learn," he said, "to give mortall men no 
greater power than they are content they shall use, for use it they will 
... " And he located the problem squarely within. Because "there is a 
straine in a mans heart that will sometime or other runne out to ex-
cesse ... It is necessary therefore, that all power that is on earth be 
limited ... " 4 
These are sobering cautions for political life. They are reflected in 
the thought and actions of our deepest political thinkers and they deeply 
inform our institutions. Consider, for example, James Madison, the 
"Father of the Constitution," on human nature. The mischiefs and 
violence of faction, "the mortal diseases under which popular govern-
ments have everywhere perished," will remain a problem, he says, as 
long as "the reason of man continues fallible ... " and "the connection 
subsists between his reason and his self-love. "5 He mentions, as well, 
the unequal faculties of acquiring property. 6 "The latent causes of fac-
tion are thus sown in the nature of man .... " 7 Madison concludes, 
soberly: "The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of 
faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the 
means of controling its effects." 8 The radical solution, removing some 
ultimate cause, attempted with such zeal and passion in the subsequent 
revolutions, has uniformly failed, often in seas of blood. 
Drawing again on this sober view of human nature, Madison says 
in Federalist 51 that a "separate and distinct exercise of the different 
powers of government ... is ... essential to the preservation of liberty 
••• "
9 Indeed: 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The 
interest of the man must be connected with the con-
stitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on 
human nature, that such devices should be necessary 
to controul the abuses of government. But what is 
government itself but the greatest of all reflections on 
human nature? If men were angels, no government 
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, 
neither external or internal controuls on government 
would be necessary. 10 
And Madison concluded: "This policy of supplying by opposite and 
rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through 
the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public" .11 
American institutions reflect both confidence and caution. As 
Madison put it in Federalist 55: "As there is a degree of depravity in 
mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and 
distrust: So there are other qualities in human nature, which justify a 
certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government 
presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than 
any other form. " 12 
"[S]own in the nature of man," a "connection ... between his 
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reason and his self-love," "the causes . .. cannot be removed," "[a]mbi-
tion must be made to counteract ambition," "the defect of better 
motives," "a degree of depravity in mankind," "if men were angels," 
"what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human 
nature?": There is a sobriety undergirding our institutions that does 
not stem from the Enlightenment. John Cotton can be proud. 
But of what significance is all this? There seems nothing to remark 
about the American founding, it is so commonsensical, until one com-
pares it with the French, Soviet, Chinese, Vietnamese, Cambodian, or 
Fascist revolutions and their foundings. The others, aiming so high, 
engaged in with such passion and fervor, have fallen extraordinarily 
short. The French Revolution, infused with Enlightenment confidence 
in reason, the perfectability of man, and progress; infused as well with 
Rousseau's romantic conception that man is by nature good, and only 
corrupted by bad institutions; informed by his view that the only 
actions of government that can make it legitimate are actions in 
conformity with the General Will, a will not necessarily to be found by 
a majority vote; informed, disastrously, with his belief that a person 
acting against the General Will, or mistaken about that will, can be 
"forced to be free," ended with the Jacobins, confident that they alone 
understood the people's genuine interests, establishing the terror in 
which they ended the republic and executed the elected represen-
tatives of the people. 
Liberty, equality, and fraternity, in the hands of revolutionaries 
like these, inspired by naive and utopian hopes, informed by the most 
extraordinary insobriety about human nature and revolutionary 
leaders' rights, produced the first of those great revolutions promising 
a human rebirth, but ending in terror, blood, and tyrannical rule. 
Modernity, having jettisoned those understandings that made 
Americans sober and cautious, proceeded to produce revolution after 
revolution beginning in the wildest enthusiasm and hope, and ending in 
disappointment and disaster. 
The greatest founder of the last century and a half was Karl Marx. 
His ideas, in endless permutations, have swept the world. Yet the na-
tions claiming his mantle are not a lovely lot. The Soviet Union re-
mains a one party state that, under Lenin, quickly dispersed the 
elected representatives of the people, destroyed the other parties, and 
killed many of their members. It is a state that quickly ended freedom 
of opponents to speak, publish, assemble, or organize. It is a state, 
formed in the name of the workers, that destroyed all independent 
trade unions, and prevents them to this day; a state, originally composed 
mainly of farmers, that promised farmers land, and then, when it was 
strong enough, forced the farmers, over their furious resistance, on to 
collective or state farms, a policy that led to a deliberate policy of star-
vation in the Ukraine, a famine that took millions of lives, 13 and fed ad-
ditional millions of farmers and their families into the vast system of 
forced labor camps, the "Gulag," where still more millions died. It is a 
state that persecuted the religious for trying to practice their faith and 
forbids teaching the young religion even to this day. It is a state that, at 
the height of Stalin's purges in the mid-thirties, executed, usually by a 
bullet in the base of the skull, perhaps 40,000 people a month. 14 It is a 
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state that has largely sealed its borders to its own people. And it has 
done all this in the name of Marx and his disciple, Lenin. 
The viciousness of the Soviet state, though it did not begin with 
Stalin, has sometimes been explained as the aberration of one man, 
Stalin. But that cannot explain why a good system full of men of good 
will put up with Stalinism for decades, and, even more telling, it 
doesn't explain why so many Marxist regimes have produced similar 
"a berrations ." China, under Mao, we now know, also executed 
millions during the period of the "rectification" campaigns and collec-
tivization of agriculture. 15 China, under Mao, also ended free trade 
unions, forced farmers into an agricultural system that many bitterly 
resisted, again with the death of millions (official Chinese sources ad-
mit 10 million died of starvation under Mao).16 China also destroyed op-
position parties, virtually halted higher education for a period of years 
under the Red Guards, closed every church in China but two for nearly 
ten years, 17 destroyed the vast monastary system in Tibet, 18 sealed its 
borders and, in general, acted very much indeed like Stalinist Russia. 
Vietnam followed many of the same policies, ending free trade 
unions, opposition parties, free speech and press, collectivizing 
agriculture in the North against bitter resistence, briefly trying some of 
the same agricultural policies in the South, but backing off, like China. 
Vietnam also gave the world a new term, "boat people," as very large 
numbers fled to sea, vast numbers there to perish. 
But none of the Marxist regimes, not even Stalin's, quite matched 
the horrors of Cambodia. David Hawk, anti-Vietnam War activist, U.S. 
executive director of Amnesty International from 1974 to 1978, says 
that: "From the middle of 1975 to the end of 1978, between one million 
and three million Cambodians, out of a population of about seven 
million, died at the hands of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge." 19 Whole 
categories of people were executed including members of the former 
government, army personnel, "intellectuals," as well as many ethnic 
groups-ethnic Indians, Chinese, Vietnamese. Hawk tells of his own 
interview with Heng Chan, a peasant. "His wife had been of Viet-
namese descent. He told me that the Khmer Rouge had killed not only 
her, but five of their sons, three of their daughters, three of their 
grandchildren, and sixteen other members of his wife's family." 20 And 
like the Soviets and the Chinese, these "Paris-educated ideologues" at-
tacked religion. 
The Khmer Rouge policy toward Buddhism was 
one of the most brutal and thoroughgoing suppres-
sions of religion in modern history. The monkhood 
was disrobed, disbanded, and destroyed. Of an 
estimated pre-1975 population of forty thousand to 
sixty thousand monks, only eight hundred to one thou-
sand survived and returned to their former monastery 
sites ... 21 
External conquest ended this genocidal slaughter. 
Will there be other Soviet Unions, Chinas, Cambodias? Is Ethiopia, 
perhaps, next? Is there an insobriety in Marx and Engels that can, in 
part, account for this sequence of regimes? Let us turn to the most 
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famous statement of the Marxist fundamentals, The Communist 
Manifesto, and see. 
Note first what Marx and Engels (hereafter Marx) think of the 
various classes and groups that compose society. What does Marx 
think of the bourgeoisie? It is the practitioner of "naked, shameless, 
direct, brutal exploitation." What does he think of the "lower middle-
class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant 
... ?" "[T]hey are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of 
history. " 22 
What, then, does Marx think of his fellow socialists? The "feudal 
socialism" of aristocrats is "half lamentation, half lampoon ... but 
always ludicrous in its effect ... '' 23 The socialism of petty bourgeoisie 
and peasant is "both reactionary and Utopian," ending "in a miserable 
fit of the blues." 24 German or "true" socialism is "the bombastic 
representative of the petty bourgeois Philistine," its literature "foul 
and enervating. " 25 
Conservative socialists, "economists, philanthropists, human-
itarians, improvers of the condition of the work class, organizers of 
charity, members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, 
temperance fanatics, hole and corner reformers of every imaginable 
kind," are "desirous of redressing social grievances in order to secure 
the continued existence of bourgeois society." 26 Critical-Utopian 
Socialists and Communists, finally, are useful at first, but their 
"disciples have, in every case, formed mere reactionary sects." 27 
Marx's words drip with scorn for reformers and rival socialists. He 
catagorizes the bulk of every society (the bourgeoisie plus the "lower 
middle-class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the 
peasant . . . ") as exploiters or reactionaries who would "try to roll back 
the wheel of history. "28 But if Marx lacked confidence in others, he 
certainly did not lack confidence in his Communists. Consider what he 
has to say in his section on "Proletarians and Communists." 
How do Communists stand in relation to other working-class par-
ties? They "always and everywhere represent the interests of the 
movement as a whole. " 29 "They have no interests separate and apart 
from those of the proletariat as a whole. " 30 What extraordinary claims! 
If they are true, then opposition to Communists is always mistaken or 
factional and against the interest of the movement as a whole. 
How then do the Communists stand in relation to the working-class 
itself, to the proletariat? Marx asserts that "they have over the great 
mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line 
of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the pro-
letarian movement. " 31 If, then, the great mass of the proletariat 
disagrees with the Communists, it is because they do not understand 
the line of march and their own interests. The party, not the pro-
letariat, is the judge. 
The bourgeoisie are oppressors. The middle-class, the small 
manufacturers, the shopkeepers, the artisans, the peasants-
cumulatively the majority of every then existing society-are reac-
tionaries resisting the great wheel of history. Resistance to the Com-
munist lead by other working-class parties or socialists is error or nar-
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row factionalism. Resistance by the proletariat is failure to understand 
their own true interests. The source of Leninist excesses, the founda-
tion for that arrogant vanguardism of Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Fidel, and 
Pol Pot, was laid by the founders themselves, Marx and Engels. 
The Communist party alone can be trusted to know the line of 
march. What, then, is the line of march? What is the cure for social 
evils? Marx and Engels say that their program "may be summed up in 
a single sentence: Abolition of private property." 32 "The proletariat 
will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from 
the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands 
of the state ... " 33 This will require "despotic inroads on the rights of 
property ... " 34 (This proved quite prophetic. To centralize all in-
struments of production in the state meant that the property of the 
bourgeoisie, the small manufacturers, the artisans, the mom and pop 
retailers, the farmers all had to be seized, against their will-which, 
since these together always made a majority, had to be done 
despotically, as it has been done, again and again.) 
The famous ten point program to follow the revolution continues 
this focus on property relations. It suggests abolition of property in 
land (consider what that has meant for relations between Communist 
states and farmers), heavy graduated income tax and abolition of in-
heritance, a state monopoly of credit (an enormous centralization of 
power), centralization of the means of communication and transporta-
tion, establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture 
(would farmers or workers choose that?), combination of agriculture 
and manufacturing, redistribution of population, and free public 
schools for all (aimed at then prevalent religious education?). What one 
notices in all this is the enormous centralization of power in the hands 
of the state and the impossibility that this program could be carried out 
by majority votes. Marx and Engels are the legitimate fathers of the 
tyrannies constructed in their names. 
Marx and Engels do say that the revolution will be democratic, for 
the state will be in the hands of the proletariat. 35 But how in fact will 
the proletariat rule? How will they effectively impose their will on the 
government? What will the structure or the process be? Will there be 
safeguards for a free press, free speech, fair elections, an organized op-
position? Will there be a written constitution, a bill of rights, separation 
of powers, an independent judiciary? What safeguards will there be 
against abuse of power by the party vanguard? Marx and Engels are 
entirely silent on this. 
Consider now our founders and theirs. Our founders believed that 
if the King of the universe was willing to make Himself a constitutional 
monarch by binding Himself in covenants with man, then no man or 
group of men had the right to absolute rule over other men. They 
believed, then, in government by contract and consent, by right, and 
they implemented their beliefs. But they were marked by caution, too, 
for they understood men to be sinners, none to be trusted with un-
checked power, so they gave us a system of government marked by 
written constitutions, separation of powers, checks and balances, bills 
of rights, independent judiciaries, federalism, and active but limited 
republican government. 
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It has not been perfect. The balance of power tends toward 
stalemate, and once to civil war. But its worst failures-failures in 
respect to blacks, women, native Americans-were precisely for those 
not included in the elaborate structure designed to prevent abuse by 
non-angelic men. The failings derived, that is, from a failure to apply 
the founders' principles to all, not from a failure of the principles 
themselves. 
Our founders' modern rivals, however, have produced failure after 
catastrophic failure, and the cause can be located precisely in their 
founding principles. Marx and Engels, for example, had confidence, 
but it was an extraordinary confidence in themselves and their 
understanding, not a confidence in their fellow men. Sure of 
themselves beyond all reason, and of their party, they scorned others, 
ignored their right to give or withhold consent, and, like the ]acobins of 
the French revolution and the Duces and Fuhrers of the Fascist revolu-
tions, showed not the slightest understanding of their own or the 
vanguard's fallibility and human frailty, and they suggested no steps to 
limit their own power . The result has been extraordinary arrogance 
and abuse. 
But the failure to check the vanguard was to be expected, for Marx 
and Engels had an extraordinarily shallow and simplistic understand-
ing of the human condition. Evil entered the world, they believed, 
through a damning institution, private ownership of the means of pro-
duction. With its elimination, they believed, virtually all human woes 
would cease. How simple, if true. Father Ernesto Cardenal, 
Nicaraguan Cultural Affairs Minister, believes it still. "Private property 
is the original sin that lead to all forms of injustice. " 36 But the remedy 
has been tried, and it does not cure. Despite Herculean efforts and 
Hitlerian cruelties, there is no New Man, no heaven on earth, and all 
the old evils live on. 
One must finally say to Marxists, as John Cotton or James 
Madison might have, "Private property is power, but why, if men are 
angels, would that power be abused? Private property is power, but if 
power leads to abuse, then how can the concentration of virtually all 
power-political, military, economic, communications, transportation, 
education-in the same and almost entirely unchecked hands be a 
cure?" 
How utterly naive Marx finally was, and how arrogant. We were 
marvellously fortunate in our founders. 
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